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The following paper is a comprehensive understanding of Global Value Chains, focusing on 
their evolution and current situation. Since their rise in the 80s, GVCs have been a key feature 
of the globalized world. In the paper it can be seen how most countries participate in GVCs 
whether through forward or backward linkages and how this participation has impacted on 
them. However, several trends and the deglobalization in which the current economy is, are 
changing the way GVCs operate. Shaping the appropriate reconfiguration of GVCs is 
essential for international managers. Aspects such as protectionism, increasing labor costs, 
environmental pressure and the Covid-19 pandemic are influencing GVCs and should be 
taken into account. Several projections are considered in the paper related to GVCs, from the 
emerging of new economies to the displacement of China as the main world manufacturer. 
Several databases have been used like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database, the 
World Bank and OECD national accounts data and the World Wealth and Income Database.   
 
Resumen:  
El presente trabajo es un análisis exhaustivo de las Cadenas Globales de Valor, centrándose 
en su evolución y situación actual. Desde su aparición en los años 80, las CGV han sido una 
característica clave del mundo globalizado. En el documento se puede ver cómo la mayoría 
de los países participan en las CGV, ya sea a través de “forward” o “backward linkages”, 
y cómo esta participación ha repercutido en ellos. Sin embargo, varias tendencias y la 
desglobalización en la que se encuentra la economía, están cambiando el funcionamiento de 
las CGV. Desarrollar la reconfiguración adecuada de las CGV es esencial para los 
directores internacionales. Aspectos como el proteccionismo, el aumento de los costes 
laborales, la presión medioambiental y la pandemia del virus Covid-19 están influyendo en 
las CGV y deben tenerse en cuenta. En el documento se comentan varias proyecciones 
relacionadas con las CGV, desde la aparición de nuevas economías hasta el desplazamiento 
de China como principal fabricante mundial.  Se han utilizado varias bases de datos, como 
la del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), los datos de las cuentas nacionales del Banco 
Mundial y la OCDE, y la base de datos de riqueza e ingresos mundiales.    
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1. Introduction: Rise of Global Value Chains 
 
 
The concept of Value Chain was first introduced by Michael E.Porter in the book 
“Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (1985)” where the 
Harvard graduate defined Value Chain as “a collection of activities that are performed by a 
company to create value for its customers”. Therefore, this aforementioned value created 
during the process is what leads to the subsequent competitive advantage.  
On the other hand, the concept of Supply Chain which was first mentioned by an article of 
the newspaper “The Independent” in 1905, is defined as a network of organizations 
(suppliers, factories, distributors, clients, third-party logistics...) taking part in the 
manufacturing, delivery and sale of products or services to clients (Le Moigne, 2017).  
The origin of both concepts can be traced down to the 20th century with the rise of the Second 
Industrialization (1914) and the First Globalization (1870 and 1914) as a consequence. The 
Second Industrial Revolution had a major impact in transport and telecommunications which 
lead to an increase in trade and communication between regions, connecting the different 
economies of the world. However, the most important breakthrough that indeed is believed 
to be the start of Supply Chains is the invention of the Assembly Line in the 1920s by Henry 
Ford. Ford is considered the pioneer of modern Supply Chains, as the assembly line 
innovative system completely changed the manufacturing process that was used until that 
date. The division of labor created by the assembly line, concept which was firstly introduced 
by Adam Smith, permitted to increase productivity reducing the costs and workforce needed. 
This systematic approach was therefore extended to other industries creating a benchmark 
for the supply chain management.  
A new concept related to both Supply Chains and Value Chain, known as Global Value 
Chains (GVCs), appeared in the 80s. GVCs, following the main concept, can be defined as 
the network created by a company that expands to several countries with the purpose of 
creating and distributing products and services to customers.  
Global Value Chains emerged due to the ideological movement known as Neoliberalism that 
appeared in the 70s as a response to the Keynesian policies implemented by the USA 
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government after the Great Depression in 1936. The Golden Age of Capitalism (1951-1973) 
where Keynesian economic thinking was the mainstream, stated that the main driving force 
for the economy was the aggregate consumer demand. Therefore, these policies encouraged 
the intervention of government in the economy injecting money in order to build 
infrastructures, improve education and other public services with the purpose of increasing 
consumer demand. 
However, they were displaced by Neoliberalism, which was the response to the 
aforementioned policies and the striking oil crisis in 1973. Neoliberalism, “a theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” Harvey (2005, 
p. 2), permitted the creation of more globalized structures for supply chains. According to 
the definition, neoliberalism economic thinking opposes to the intervention of governments, 
giving them a restricted scope of actions limited to regulation of contracts, monetary policy, 
etc. This less restricted economy permitted free trade between countries, changing protective 
economies by economies oriented towards exports and imports, giving rise to what we know 
today as Global Value Chains.  
There is clear evidence reflecting the shift from Local Value Chains to CVGs in the main 
economies of the World during the 80s which can be exemplified by these two facts. The 
first one was the emerging of governing bodies and agreements with international scope that 
regulated international trade. The main purpose of these types of supra national organizations 
was to overcome the major challenges that came with the globalization of the world, which 
included cooperation and resolution of conflicts between economies and companies 
operating in several countries.  International bodies that can be highlighted are the foundation 
of United Nations in 1945 in San Francisco, USA, which main goal is to maintain worldwide 
peace and security while encouraging cooperation between members, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1996. The WTO is the main international body enforcing 
international trade laws and rules. Other agreements were also created during the 80s and 
90s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1990 or the Asia-Pacific 
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Economic Cooperation Agreement (APEC) in 1989. Furthermore, international trade and 
GVCs lead to the creation of worldwide standards like IFRS in 2001. 
The second evidence that highly endorses GVCs impact is the increasing relationship 
between countries, especially in terms of trade. As it can be seen from Table 1. Exports of 
goods and services for the World in page 41, there has been an important increase in exports 
since 1960. The indicator used, “Exports of Goods and Services as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product of the World” (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS), shows how from 1960 to 1970 the 
exports were increasing in a stable trend notably rising during the first years of the 70s.    
World trade has been increasing since the 60s and the international approach to create value 
in products and services has also invigorated considerably. One of the main reasons is the 
benefits Global Value Chains have, or at least have had until now. Developed economies, 
have gained mostly in cost-based benefits, due to both cheaper labor costs and availability of 
raw materials. Furthermore, recent studies show that GVCs have had a positive impact on 
productivity and income per capita, especially for medium and high-income countries. While 
in developing countries have had a positive impact as well, studies show that changes are less 
important than in developed countries and can be surpassed by several drawbacks such as 
deregulation of labor rights and environmental issues, aspects which will be later analyzed.  
Despite the aforementioned fact, one advantage that can be highlighted regarding emerging 
economies is the increment of foreign investment, followed by the ability to integrate in the 
world economy reaching industrialization at a rapid rate. GVCs in developing countries have 
had also a positive impact on local companies, as they have benefited from shared 
information and knowledge from global companies established there.  
Two indexes are usually used to measure GVCs participation: backward and forward 
linkages.  Backward linkages are defined as the share of foreign value-added in total exports 
of a country and forward linkages are the domestic value-added embodied in intermediate 





2. Evolution of Global Value Chains 
 
 
Global Value Chains literature is still relatively scarce, as it was not until the 1990s when 
Regional Value Chains started to developed into GVCs. Therefore, quantification of GVCs 
is a difficult task despite having several data bases that permit to carry out reliable 
conclusions. 
 
Participation and main countries involved in GVCs  
 
Several studies have been performed in order understand the issue of vertical specialization, 
including the pioneer in the subject David Hummels. Vertical specialization occurs when a 
country uses imported intermediate parts to produce goods it later exports. This definition 
captures the idea that countries link sequentially to produce a final good defined as GVCs. 
(Hummels, 2001) 
It is assumed that a country can participate in vertical specialization in two ways: first, uses 
imported intermediate inputs to produce exports; second, exports intermediate goods that are 
used as inputs by other countries to produce final goods for export. (Koopman, 2014) 
The first type is defined as backward linkage participation and the second type is called 
forward linkage participation. The sum of both types can be used as an indicator to identify 
the total participation of an economy in GVCs. If a country has a more predominant backward 
participation the economy itself is positioned in the final phases of the supply chain, that is 
to say closer to the final consumer. On the other hand, if an economy shows clear evidence 
that the type of participation is forward, the economy is placed in the early stages of the 
supply chain. This last type of linkage shows a specialization of the country in exports of 
intermediate products.  
A recent study (Álvarez, 2020) conducted using the data bases of Trade in Value Added, 
TiVA disclosed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has concluded that those economies closer to the 
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final consumer (backward linkages) are more sensible and are indeed more exposed to supply 
shocks, an aspect that could be proved with the Covid sanitary crisis.  
The same database TiVA will be used to carry out an evolutionary analysis of participation 
in GVCs. The database seeks to analyze the value added by a country in the production of 
any good or service that is then exported and offers a comprehensive picture of commercial 
relations between nations. The last edition was published in 2018 and included indicators for 
the period 2005-2015. It comprises 64 economies: all OECD, EU28 and G20 countries, most 
East and South-east Asian economies and a selection of South American countries. 
Participation in backward linkages is calculated using the foreign value added as share of 
gross exports. On the other hand, participation in forward linkages is calculated with the 
domestic value added in foreign exports as a share of gross exports.  
To perform an analysis on the degree of participation of the different economies in the world 
it is necessary to sum up both, backward linkages and forward linkages of a particular 
country. In order to assess how this concept has changed over time, it has been calculated for 
both years, 2005 and 2015. In Map 1. Global Participation of the World Economies in GVCs 
in 2005 in page 41 shows that the minimum percentage an economy had was 27% and the 
maximum was 69%, belonging respectively to New Zealand and Luxemburg. The former has 
such a strong participation in GVCs due to its relevant backward linkages, which contribute 
up to 58%. In economies where the main form of participation is through backward linkages, 
the production of outputs requires substantial Intermediate Inputs from many other 
industries (exports from other countries) and therefore are closer to the final consumer of the 
product. Another important figure was the 61.2% of participation that Malta had. This was a 
similar case to Luxemburg as the backward linkages of Malta contributed up to 50%, 
becoming mainly dependent of imported Intermediate goods. One of the reasons that explains 
such high figures is the small size of these two countries.  
On the other hand, New Zealand compared with the other economies in the study participates 
in GCV with a low degree. It is important to highlight that the main economic activity and 
exports of the country were and are agricultural products, mainly meat. Agricultural products 
and services such as tourism, another important economic activity of the country does not 
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need as much inputs from other economies as other industry- intensive goods. It is also 
relevant the isolation of the country which makes international trade less accessible. 
Excluding the marginal data, the Asiatic region shows relatively high percentages of 
participation in GCVs. For instance countries such as Singapore (63.7%), Chinese Taipei 
(53.8%), Korea (53.3%), Malaysia (60.9%), Thailand (52.1%) and Vietnam (50.5%) are 
among the highest. 
Looking at Map 3. Global Participation of the World Economies in GVCs in 2015 in page 
42 it can be inferred how the world economy has evolved.  The gap between the maximum 
and the minimum participation increased. The highest continues to be Luxembourg with 
73,4% (a 4% greater than in 2005). Regarding the lowest, it is 26.2% (1% lower than in 2005) 
belonging this time to Argentina, which replaced New Zealand, although the figures of both 
countries were similar. 
An important aspect that can be highlighted is the presence of the Easter European economies 
in the GCVs in 2015. Countries such as Czech Republic (58.6%), Hungary (63.1%), Slovak 
Republic (65.4%), Slovenia (55%) or Bulgaria (53.9%), despite having a relatively high 
percentage of participation in 2005, the participation is more accentuated in 2015. A possible 
explanation to this increase could be the membership and integration of these economies in 
the intra-Community trade of the European Union, as it was not until 2004 that they joined 
the EU, being 2007 for Bulgaria.  
While there are changes during the analyzed period, it can be concluded that variations were 
really small as Asiatic countries maintained their strong participation. 
In Map 2. Position of the World Economies in the Supply Chain in 2005 and Map 4. Position 
of the World Economies in the Supply Chain in 2015 in page 42 and 43 respectively, is 
represented what type of linkages an economy has. Those countries with a darker color show 
a positive result in the difference between linkages and therefore have predominant forward 
linkages. Those countries with lighter color and negative result have more backward 
linkages. The two world economies where most of the exports are based on imported 
intermediate products are Luxembourg and Malta in both 2005 and 2015. On the other hand, 
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Arabia Saudi is the economy most specialized in the manufacturing of exported intermediate 
goods for both periods. 
When comparing regions in 2015 we find that the European Union (28 countries) has a 
difference of 2.5, being slightly specialized in the manufacturing of intermediate products 
versus final goods. However, this number is even higher for the United States (9.7) or the 
Non-OECD economies and aggregates with a 12.7.  
The graphs Graph 2. Backward Linkages from 2005 to 2015, Graph 3. Forward Linkages 
from 2005 to 2015 and Graph 4. Global Participation in the GVCs from 2005 to 2015 in 
pages 43 and 44, show the evolutionary pattern the main world economies have followed. 
Two main periods can be highlighted: 2007 and 2014-2015. 
In all the graphs there is a recession of all the indicators during the year 2007, however the 
decrease was higher in the backward linkages than in the forward linkages. This proves that 
those economies that rely more on backward linkages are more vulnerable to external shocks 
and therefore more affected. While forward linkages and the participation percentage of the 
different economies have been stable more or less through the years, backward linkages were 
more volatile especially during the period 2014-2015 where they decreased, anticipating the 
current trend defined as deglobalization. When looking at China, one of the most important 
economies in GVCS, it can be seen that has a strong position in both backward and forward 
linkages during 2005-2015. The Asian country has been the focal point of both trends: it is 
the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods and the world’s largest importer of many 
raw materials. (Gereffi, 2015). 
A more intensive study will follow regarding the blocks in which economies can be spitted: 
developing economies and developed countries, analyzing how globalization, especially the 




GVCs and their impact: China’s case 
 
In 2016 the newspaper “The Economist” asked “YouGov”, a firm that specializes in market 
research internet-based, to conduct a survey on people’s attitudes towards immigration, trade 
and globalization. The result (Graph 6. Attitudes towards globalization against change in 
GDP per person, page 45) revealed a breach between developing economies and the Western 
countries. The countries that agreed the most with the statement “Globalization is a good 
force”, were India, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, countries that are indeed 
considered emerging economies. On the other hand, developed economies were not as 
convinced.  
In order to assess whether Globalization has or has had a positive impact, some indicators 
can be taken into account to measure the impact on national output, labor market, inequality 
and information-sharing.  
Several trends indicate that trade openness has correlated with better macroeconomic 
performance in many EMEs (Arslan, Contreras, Patel, Shu, 2019). Indicators such as GDP 
growth or GDP per capita can be used to measure the economic performance and living 
standards of EMEs. In Graph 7.GDP growth (annual %) for several economies in page 46, 
appears the GDP growth rate for both developed economies (United States and Spain) and 
developing countries (China and India). It can be seen that prior to 1979 developing 
economies fluctuated from positive to negative growth rates, while on the other hand, 
developed economies had positive growing rates since the beginning (excluding the United 
States in 1982 when the recession ended). Since 1979, China and India have maintained 
higher GDP growth rates than developed economies. Furthermore, 1979 was an important 
year for China as they opened to international trade for the first time. The expansion of Global 
Supply Chains and the Second Globalization (1985) coincide with those years. Therefore, 
the better macroeconomic performance of both countries could be attributed to some extent 
to their participation in the world economy.  
Another impact of Global Value Chains is related to the labor market. While the impact is 
broadly positive, there are several remarks to take into account. The core of GVC 
development has three main processes: importing, exporting and foreign direct investment.  
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Corporations participating in GVCs are typically involved in at least one of three processes 
and usually in all three simultaneously. In all cases, there is strong econometric evidence at 
the firm- and industry-levels to show that internationalized firms are larger (employ more 
workers) and pay higher wages than domestically-owned firms. (Shepherd, 2013). 
Exporting corporations (participants of GVCs), produce a higher labor demand than non-
exporting corporations (only present in the domestic market) for several reasons.  A sound 
explanation would be that exporters tend to have higher sales and in order to cope with 
demand more workers are needed. However, higher output is not the only reason, as in order 
to become an exporter firm, production processes and supply chain management has to be 
improved. As a result, firms must employ skilled workers with experience in the field. This 
concept was introduced as the “preparation effect” by Iacovone and Javorcik in 2012. 
GVCs are believed as well to have a repercussion on wages and equality. While scholars at 
the beginning of empirical literature (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1999; Geishecker and Görg, 2008; Hijzen, 2007) believed that the major wage 
changes depended on the skill level of labor force, more recent studies throw the idea that 
not only the skill degree is important but also the type of task. A study conducted by 
Baumgarten for German workers showed that a higher degree of interactivity, and non-
routine activities, protect workers from wage adjustments. 
Looking at the links between GVC participation and wage inequality, the empirical results 
say that the degree of participation in GVCs is not the main driver of wage inequality but the 
nature of GVC participation. We can mention two types of participation: low-skilled 
offshoring and high-skill offshoring.  
 
• The most common one (or at least until recently) is low-skilled offshoring from high-
income countries to low-income countries. Another common characteristic about this 
type of offshoring is that activities are also routinely tasks (Ex: assembly). As a 
consequence, low-skilled workforce from the high-income country has to compete 
with the salaries and labor costs of low-skilled workers in the emerging economies. 
This leads to an adjustment of wages in the developed economies for low-skilled 
workers, increasing the inequality gap between income groups. In conclusion, low 
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skilled employees in routinary works tend to be adversely affected by world trade 
liberalization, especially in already established economies. (Heckscher Ohlin-
Samuelson) 
 
• The other type of offshoring is high-skilled, which consist on outsourcing tasks that 
require more knowledge, such as software developing or innovation activities. In the 
past few years this trend has increased, as a lot of companies have outsourced services 
to other countries. The impact of this type of offshoring on wages is still unclear. 
Some scholars believe that this type of offshoring could lead to a decrease in wages 
of high-skilled workers of high-income countries (like it has happened with low-
skilled workers). This type of offshoring also could have an impact on wage 
inequality in low-income countries. As high-skilled workers in developing countries 
are more demanded, their wages tend to increase. This leads again to a greater 
inequality between income groups.  
 
Therefore, the impact GVCs have on the labor market will vary depending on the type of 
labor needed. The ratio unskilled workers vs skilled workers will also change depending on 
the sector in which the firm is operating. Industries such as educational and health services 
require skilled workforce while mining, construction or agriculture require less skilled 
employees (Table 1. Skilled to unskilled ratio in industries, page 47). 
Inequality does not only apply to labor force, but in general to the whole population. The 
integration of countries to the global economy through a complex series of “flows”, like trade 
and investment (GVC) have as a consequence not only the wage adjustments, but is also 
helping to shift the equilibrium between labor and capital, giving a greater share of income 
to the owners of capital (entrepreneurs) and a smaller share to workers. When looking at 
graphs, Graph 12. Relationship between trade and inequality-China and Graph 13. 
Relationship between trade and inequality- The United States in page 49 a relationship 
between trade as a share of GDP (participation in GVCs) and inequality can be introduced. 
Taking into account a developed country (United States) and a developing economy (China), 
a connection can be drawn between the two indicators: when international trade increases 
after 1980, inequality also does. On the other hand, when shocks occur in trade (2007 
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economic crisis) inequality also tends to decrease. However, when looking at other countries 
the link is not as clear. India for instance, has had an increase in inequality since it started to 
participate in the global economy, however the economic crisis only made inequality to 
increase at a slower pace rather than decreasing it.  
 
Regarding the impact on living conditions, looking at Graph 9. GDP per capita (current US$) 
for several economies in page 47 it can be seen than while GDP per capita has increased for 
both developing countries, India and China, developed economies as Spain or The United 
States have increased as well. Therefore, while it may seem that globalization and openness 
to international trade have contributed to a better standard of living for developing 
economies, is still very far away from the levels of more advanced economies. 
Global Value Chain (GVC) approach has recently proved that international links have an 
important role on technological knowledge access and innovation improvements (Gereffi, 
1994 and 1999; Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002 a and b). Related to this 
framework, several empirical studies have shown that relationships between global firms and 
local producers in EMEs (developing countries) may lead to learning and innovation 
activities (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1999; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2001; Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Giuliani et al., 2005). This link between international and local corporations is defined as 
“firm upgraded”. Some concerns related to “firm upgraded” have yet to be reviewed as is not 
clear how Global Value Chains exactly encourage upgrading processes in emerging 
countries. The improvement would not be as direct as thought. In order to enter global value 
chains, local firms need to invest first in obtaining technological abilities to effectively 
engage in the world economy. This is sometimes difficult due mainly to lack of funds, 
information and government policies. That is why a lot of emerging economies try to attract 
FDI as is believed that technological and managerial knowledge can ultimately lead to build 
technological capabilities, known as well as “indigenous innovation” within the developing 
country.  
 
It is believed therefore that overall GVCs matter for economic development in several ways, 
since the ability of countries to prosper depends on their participation in the global economy, 
which is largely a story about their role in GVCs (Gereffi and Lee, 2012).  
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Engaging in GVCs, whether is through direct foreign investment or through imports and 
export of intermediate products leads to positive outcomes both in terms of output and 
information sharing, despite the possibility of an inequality increase between income groups 
or the still poor living conditions of the population in developing economies. Studies suggests 
that while GVCs are linked to higher employment opportunities and development, other 
benefits such as income gains or working conditions will depend on the type of participation.  
 
Regarding the main developing economies, China has been a key participant of source of 
supply for the majority of industries and has established itself as the leading provider in 
Global Value Chains. The Asian country, defined by the World Bank as “the fasted sustained 
expansion by a major economy in history”, is a clear example of how industrialization and 
participation in the global economy has enabled a country to increment their GDP and GDP 
per capita. Before 1979, China was governed by Mao Zedong, who controlled the economy 
of the country using a centrally-oriented model. The main features of the model were 
controlled prices, high government intervention and production goals. Furthermore, as the 
objective was to convert China into a self-sufficient economy, international trade was limited 
only to goods that were difficult to produce within the country.  The average GDP growth 
rate during 1961-1978 as seen in Graph 10. GDP growth (annual %) – China in page 48 is 
believed to be 5,37% (the reliability of the data has been questioned by analysts, as during 
this period, Chinese government officials usually exaggerated production levels due to 
several political motives (Morrison, 2015)). For the same period, the GDP growth rate during 
1979-1996 was 10,01%. When taking into account a longer period, 1979-2020 the average 
GDP growth was 9,39%. While innovations in communication, transportation and 
technology, have increased productivity and therefore contributed to this increment in GDP, 
a clear component was globalization and participation in the world trade (GVC). It is 
important to mention that since 2012 growth rates have been more stable and closer to already 
developed economies. Rates around 6% are still relatively high, however as output level 
achieved by China is really high (almost as high as the leading country, Graph 7. GDP growth 
(annual %) for several economies, page 46), growth rates are bound to be still positive but lower.  
This happens because it is easier to obtain higher rates in the early stages of an emerging 
economy (around 14%-15%) than once a country is already established in the World trade. 
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Therefore, we can conclude that the first major impact related to participation in GCVs (better 
macroeconomic performance in terms of output) is confirmed for China.  
Labor market in the Asian country has also undergone changes, while during 1990 to 2000 
the economic growth was mainly focused on industrial labor; the current world shift to 
service-based activities has had a major impact on employment. Using a linear regression 
model, Yan-gang from Wuhan University of Technology (2018), analyzed the impact of 
change in industrial structure and global value chain on Chinese labor employment. The 
results showed that the degree of participation in GVC of the service industry was positively 
connected to employment in the same industry. Therefore, when the participation in GCV 
was higher, the demand of workers increased as well.  
China went from being a poor and undeveloped economy in 1978 to become the world’s 
leading emerging country. However, income distribution has not been that proportionally 
distributed. As seen in Graph 12. Relationship between trade and inequality-China in page 
49, inequality, measured as the share of total income going to the top 1%, has increased since 
1980 from 6% to more than 15%, showing wealth accumulation.  
Regarding information sharing and innovation improvement linked to participation in GVC 
the Chinese market confirms the aforementioned idea. The paper by Zhu and Tomasi 
contributes to the vast empirical literature on firms in international trade, documenting a 
positive connection between firms’ imported inputs and their export performance. The study 
looked up the disaggregated Chinese customs data between 2001 and 2013, obtaining results 
that indicated GVC have an impact on the “quality channel”. The study demonstrated that 
having access to foreign inputs enabled Chinese firms to improve considerably the quality of 
products, and therefore to be able to compete with developed countries. Furthermore, the 
study strengthened that quality upgrading was even stronger when the inputs came from high-





3. Current situation of Global Value Chains: Main trends hindering GVCs 
 
 
Contrary to globalization, “deglobalization” is defined as the process in which 
interdependence and integration between countries decreases, and as a consequence world 
trade as a percentage of GDP also does.  
It is important to mention that around the concept of globalization there are several 
dimensions. Trade globalization is one of the core aspects, but political or social globalization 
are also important variables. While trade globalization has “slowed down” over the past 
years, other types of globalization such as information globalization has increased 
considerably. Some examples of the increment in information flows would be patents, high-
tech products or international data transfer.  
During the chapter the main focus will be on economic globalization oriented towards trade 
globalization.  
 
Trends hindering GVCs 
 
In the world economy there has been a cyclic phenomenon between globalization and 
deglobalization, as in 1930s and in 2008 there was a clear decrease in world integration. The 
limited literature reveals that antecedent of deglobalization were based only on economic 
factors and later included political and social dimensions (Stiglitz, 2007). However, the origin 
of the current period of deglobalization in which the economy is (Graph 1. Exports of goods 
and services for the World, page 41), is political globalization. Deglobalization starts when 
the disadvantages of globalization are perceived in national society. The main drivers are 
therefore, developed economies. There are concerns that unemployment or offshore of 
developed economies is related to increasing imports by emerging countries. As a 
consequence, when an economy is mature and “slower”, the usual political choice is towards 
protectionism in order to protect resources (Kim, H. M., Li, P., & Lee, Y. R, 2020). 
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Political concerns are not the only antecedent of deglobalization that affects Global Value 
Chains as there are other aspects hindering world trade. Some examples disrupting current 
GVC would be the increasing labor costs of China, different approaches towards costs, 
environmental pressure and the sanitary and economic crisis of Covid-19.  
 
1. Protectionism Policies and Trade Wars  
 
Increasing populism and nationalism has been shaping world trade since 2017. Since that 
year, several major political events have impacted the economy and specially the relationship 
between countries.  Gowling WLG (an international firm specialized in world trade) in their 
annual report stated that “There has been a sharp and sustained increase in discriminatory – 
or trade restricting – policies being enacted and implemented worldwide since the global 
financial crisis”.  
The main driver of protectionism measures that spread deglobalization is considered to be 
the USA, with president Trump encouraging an ‘America First’ trade policy. However, 
tensions between the two world economic leaders appeared before signing the “Presidential 
Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression”. The WTO recognized China as a 
market economy in 2017, and when an economy is granted such status, it limits the 
protectionism measures that can be taken against that country. As a consequence, the USA 
refused to recognized China as a market economy. With the main goal of reducing U.S. trade 
deficit and maintaining the lead position in the world economy, it imposed new tariffs to 
world trade, implemented restrictions on China’s investments in American technology, 
reinforced exports control and increased the products that could not be shipped to China. In 
response to these measures, China accused the U.S. of unfair trade practices. The tension 
aforementioned does not only affect the two participants, as it threatens the global economy. 
The World Bank has tried to forecast the economic impact this war trade will have using a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model, stating that “The analysis shows that a US-
China tariff escalation could reduce global exports by up to 3 percent (674 billion dollars) 
and global income by up to 1.7 percent (1.4 trillion dollars) with losses across regions”. 
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Protectionism measures have been in auge as well in Europe. “Brexit”, defined as the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union started in 2016 when 52% of 
citizens voted to leave the EU. One year later the decision was supported by the UK 
government when Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union was applied. The 
consequence of this political and economic decision has far-reaching effects in world trade, 
affecting mainly to foreign corporations operating in the UK and British corporations 
operating in Europe. It is important to mention that the European Union establishes tools in 
order to increase integration between members, permitting free trade between countries. That 
is why since its incorporation in the European Union, UK-EU trade has increased 
enormously, converting the EU the UK’s most important trade partner.  As a result, the 
withdrawal of a member will have disruptive effects on GVCs and trade. The most 
repercussed aspect is the organizational design of firms, as increased restrictions on trade 
may incurred in higher coordination costs, more complex regulations and administrative 
duties. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the world economy is undergoing through a period of 
protectionism in which international institutions are not able to act in consequence. A clear 
example of weakness in the organizations controlling world trade, would be the resignation 
of the head of the WTO, Roberto Azevedo, in August 2020. Furthermore, the WTO has been 
at a critical moment due to the blockage of its main dispute settlement mechanism, the 
Appellate Body. Defined by the WTO, “the Appellate Body was established in 1995 under 
Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU). It is a standing body of seven persons that hears appeals from reports issued 
by panels in disputes brought by WTO Members”. Currently, the institution is not able to 
review appeals due to the ongoing positions. 
After World War II, the world has actively participated in growing economic integration 
encouraged by the creation of international institutional agreements. Firms since then, have 
taken advantage of the removal of barriers to trade in order to develop global value chains. 
However, political factors and the deterioration of supranational tools have impacted 




2. Increasing labor costs of China 
 
Another aspect influencing the current situation of GVCs would be related to labor costs in 
China, key participant of source of supply in world trade. Chinese production is characterized 
by two main points. On one hand, production is based on cheap labor and low wages and on 
the other hand, Chinese exports are controlled by TNCs (Transnational Corporations). 
Therefore, foreign and Chinese managers have focused on decreasing labor costs as a strategy 
in the last years. China has been able to provide workers willing to earn low wages, as a result 
of the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s which led to a decrease in 
the worker’s rights. (Bieler, A., & Lee, C. Y, 2016) 
However, as production in the country is mainly based on the idea of cheap labor, an 
increased in these costs could interrupt the current trend of export production in China. A 
paper presented by Janet Ceglowski (Bryn Mawr College) and Stephen S. Golub 
(Swarthmore College) explored the evolution of China’s relative unit labor costs in 
manufacturing, and concluded that manufacturing unit labor costs increased from 22% to 
33% of US unit labor costs between 2003 and 2009. While both productivity and wages have 
increased in China over the past years, relative Chinese wages have increased at a greater 
rate than productivity.  
It is important to mention that labor costs in China are still considered low compared to other 
developed economies such as the U.S., The European Union, Japan, … Nevertheless, the 
increase in labor costs (one of the main competitive advantages related to GVCs location) 
can have a strong impact on China. A clear consequence is how corporations are moving 
business units to other emerging countries that present the labor costs that China had at the 
beginning. For instance, apparel manufacturers moved from China to other emerging 
countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where labor costs are one-seventh of those in China. 
Therefore, while changes in labor costs may not decrease global participation in GVCs, it 
will affect location distribution. GVCs location model can shift from China-based to other 




3. Different approaches towards costs 
 
European and U.S. manufacturers have based production in Southeast Asian countries, 
making them dependent. The main motive behind this ongoing trend has been due to 
“Globalized Supply Chain” characterized by long lead times and low landed costs. 
(Handfield, R. B., Graham, G., & Burns, L, 2020). 
GVCs were created with the purpose of lowering landed cost. Landed costs are defined as 
the total costs incurred in getting a product from the manufacturing plant to the consumer 
and are mainly focused on labor costs, transportation costs, tax costs, ... However, looking 
only at low landed costs when managing GVCs can result in long lead times, as sourcing 
products are far away. After analyzing the resilience of GVCs, other types of aspects are 
taking into consideration when calculating costs such as risk related to GVCs, being the main 
one risk of disruption.  
“Managers’ focus on supply chain risks is typically related to standard business concerns, 
such as product quality and on-time delivery. Less attention has been paid to factors such as 
supply shocks, demand fluctuations and shifts in customer behaviors” 
   (Angela Hecimovic, University of Sydney Business School) 
The supply chain management literature, Ho et al. (2015), points out seven different types of 
Global supply chain risk:  
• Manufacturing risks: strikes, accidents and poor working conditions 
• Transportation risks: disruptions to transportation and logistics due to accidents or 
government actions  
• Financial risks: fluctuations in exchange rates, wages and currency 
• Information risks: information delays and lack of transparency 
• Demand risks: demand shocks or forecasting errors 
• Supply risks: over-reliance on a supplier and supplier disruption 




Behind this new approach towards costs (more related to total costs than just landed costs) is 
the resurgence of lean and efficient manufacturers, characterized by more local inventories. 
Lean supply chains defend free-flow of information, quick response, and real-time response 
to shifts in demand or shocks. (Handfield and Linton, 2017). The main goal of this new supply 
chain management model would be to mitigate the disruption risks associated to Global 
Value Chains.  
Therefore, while GVCs have multiple advantages in terms of labor and manufacturing costs, 
other components are bound to take into account. When looking at disruption risks, supply 
chain literature identifies that more local and lean supply chains are preferred over GVCs.  
 
4. Environmental pressure 
 
Neoliberal globalization since the 80s has prioritized market and profit margin over 
environmental issues (Lehman, 2009). The increase in world trade since then, has impacted 
both economic growth and environmental elements such as biodiversity loss, water 
conservation and raw materials. A report conducted by the European Commission and the 
Joint Research Centre Institute for Environment and Sustainability in 2013 stated that 
international trade of commodities can lead to biodiversity loss. Furthermore, The North 
American Free Trade Agreement performed a study that showed how environmental impact 
of international trade differs on the extension of economic activity, the sector in which the 
GVC operates and the technology used. This difference also applies to whether the 
participant is a developed economy or not.  
Development based on forward linkages (early-stage participation) in GVCs increases per 
capita carbon emissions and international freight transport, generates air pollution. Transport 
pollution coming from GVCs is much greater than standard trade, as intermediate products 
have to travel several times before reaching the final consumer. Finally, there is an increasing 
trend where firms are migrating to countries with weaker environmental restrictions than the 
origin country. This phenomenon is defined as “pollution haven”. Pollution haven is mainly 
practiced by companies operating in high pollution manufacturing activities, moving from 
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developed countries with strong environmental regulations to less restricted developing 
economies, with the main purpose of operating under the same circumstances.  
As a result of the forementioned issues, managers, scholars and institutions are asking 
themselves whether other aspects should be taken into account apart from economic growth 
when managing GVCs. It has been recognized the importance of not only creating “greener” 
Supply Chains but sustainable ones. Sustainability is defined by the UN World Commission 
on Environment and Development as all the actions that “meet the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Therefore, 
sustainable supply chains are those that create competitive returns on their assets without 
jeopardizing the needs of internal and external stakeholders, people and the environment. 
(Kleindorfer, 2005).  
Nowadays, environmental restrictions, climate change pressure, and consumer demand are 
external forces that are influencing Global Value Chains. Some examples of these policies 
targeting environmental issues, not only on developed economies but all over the world 
would be the international environmental agreements. There are several hundred agreements 
aimed at controlling environmental actions, however, most of them are bilateral or trilateral 
binding. Therefore, while they mostly affect to countries participating in the agreement, they 
are of great relevance in an international environment. For instance, the Kyoto protocol, 
signed in 1997, targets climate mitigation and reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) of 
industrialized countries.  
While complying with the increasing environmental restrictions may have an impact on the 
profitability of GVCs and their current situation, the “Porter Hypothesis” presents a different 
idea. The concept defends that pollution is related to waste of resources and therefore stronger 
policies will encourage companies to innovate, compensating for the costs incurred in 







5. Economic crisis of Covid-19 
 
Covid-19 was recognized as a pandemic by the WHI (World Health Organization) on March 
11th, with more than 118.000 confirmed cases in 114 countries. The sanitary crisis forced 
governments to take severe measures with the purpose of reducing the spread of the virus, 
which were mainly related to financial aids, social distancing restrictions and limitations in 
international travel.  
Implications of coronavirus are not only social-related but economic-related, as the World 
Trade Organization stated “the coronavirus pandemic will bring the deepest economic 
recession of our existence”. Entire sectors had to stopped operating due to the circumstances 
and as a consequence of the limitations on air and road transportation, some products could 
not be obtained. Therefore, the already fragmented Global Value Chains were disrupted, 
especially for sanitary garments. Regarding other economic issues, the increase in 
unemployment and the lack of savings are changing also the demand-supply equilibrium. 
The unemployment of developing countries participating in GVCs will be dependent of the 
demand of products in developed economies. If demand of certain products (Ex. textile) 
decreases considerably, workers of the developing countries producing those products will 
be unemployed.   
The studies indicate that the pandemic has negatively impacted all sectors regardless of their 
industry. However, some sectors were less influenced by the shock than others. A worldwide 
survey in 2020 performed by Statista, a statistic German portal, showed that the most 
impacted sectors were manufacturing and travel/transportation. The research was based on 
repercussions on operations, supply chain, staff and profit, dividing sectors in an impact scale 
where “1” meant minor impact and “5” severe impact. The reason why manufacturing was 
appointed with a 5 was the strong relationship between the sector and GVCs. Manufacturing 
heavily relies on international trade and more than two thirds of world trade occur through 
GVCs. The sanitary crisis hit the three main “factories” in the world: China, the U.S. and the 
European Union. China is the most important exporter and the European Union is a key 
importer of inputs, therefore, both are highly integrated into Global Value Chains. As a 
26 
 
consequence, lockdown in those countries created a first-time combination of supply and 
demand shocks (Danciu, V, 2020). 
The pandemic has reinforced a number of trends already in play related to GVCs. While other 
movements had already showed some of the risks GVCs display, Covid-19 has strongly 
exposed that global supply chains may be unresponsive to external shocks in geopolitics or 
customer demand. Experts suggest that higher resilience would not only allow more flexible 
operations but GVCs would be more prepared to possible and future disruptions.   
 
Regarding international business management and the current global value chain, 
determining the appropriate reconfiguration of GVC and business strategy is essential. On 
one hand, political tensions and increasing protectionism is encouraging firms to produce 
within their countries, accessing more local suppliers. However, integration of countries, 
international trade and high participation in GVCs is an undeniable characteristic of the 
current globalized economy. While GVCs will continue existing, the management policies 
of supply chains may change. The main advantage of GVCs was the profit margin firms 
could obtain as a consequence of lower labor costs, access to raw materials…Nowadays, 
other aspects have to be taken into consideration apart from low landed costs such as the 
increasing labor costs in some developing countries, environmental regulations limiting 
operations of firms and external shocks. The aforementioned idea suggests that managers of 
GVCs would have to build more resilient supply chains. The main issue is that resilience 
comes with a price. Quoting Mr. Shih from Harvard Business School, “The real question is, 
‘Are we going to stop chasing low cost as the sole criteria for business judgment? I’m 
skeptical of that. Consumers won’t pay for resilience when they are not in crisis ‘” it can be 






4. Possible scenarios and future evolution of Global Value Chains 
 
 
Possible scenarios  
 
 
Global Value Chains have evolved since their burst in the 1980s and have become a key 
feature of the global economy and the management of international firms. As a consequence 
of the advantages of offshoring and the improvements to do so, GVC have increased in both 
number and scope over the years. It seems since 2008 (Economic crisis) GVCs have 
consolidated. While international trade recovered to the pre-economic crisis level after 2009, 
the current decrease seems to continue in time. The recent slowdown is believed to be the 
anticipation of a structural change in GVCs, incentivized by the aspects mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  
Some scholars identify the reach of a “peak trade”, expecting new trends in international 
supply chains and their organization. Possible outcomes in the next ten years would be the 
increase in domestic production, the emergence of other countries as key participants in 
world trade or the maintenance of the current model.  
 
1. Emergence of new countries as key participants 
  
Manufacturing is one of the industries that relies the most on GVCs. As the US- China trade 
war continues, and with the purpose of avoiding heavy tariffs, some companies are 
contemplating the possibility of moving manufacturing out of China, influencing current 
GVCs location. This trend was reinforced by the lack of regulations protecting intellectual 
property (IP) in the country. While the government has made a considerable effort on 
enforcing IP rights, the IP legal framework is directly connected to the country’s regulations 
and therefore a drastic change would be needed. Furthermore, human rights violations in 
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Xinjiang and the rise of costs due to the pandemic and higher wages in China are influencing 
company strategies and operations. Aging population is another issue to take into account 
when manufacturing, as the annual growth in working age population was negative for the 
first time in the last two decades. Therefore, it can be said that China is experiencing an 
exodus of foreign firms.   
Some examples of the aforementioned are Nike or Apple. Costs in Chinese apparel factories 
have been increasing for several years now and as a consequence, some fashion firms are 
considering other location options to continue with production.  While Nike still produces 
most of its products in China, cheaper costs in other countries like Vietnam are slowly 
changing this. In 2012, 32% of shoes were manufactured in China and five years later, in 
2017, only 19%. Apple on the other hand will stay in China, however, the company has asked 
suppliers Foxconn and Pegatron to move part of the production out of the country. Foxconn’s 
plan is to move to India but other suppliers are considering Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia 
as well. Furthermore, American companies are not the only ones retreating from China, as 
Samsung Electronics (Korean firm), closed its last factory there in 2019. Currently, the 
Korean company has factories all over the world, including Vietnam, India or Brazil. China 
is still the key participant of supply chains but other emerging countries are taking advantage 
of this “exodus”. Manufacturing is moving mainly to countries that have the initial 
characteristics of China (cheap labor costs and trade openness) like the so-called “Asian 
Tigers”.  
While these countries are viable alternatives for global manufacturers, each economy has to 
overcome several challenges. Some examples would be the talent shortage and political 
unrest of Malaysia or the still limited manufacturing capacity of Vietnam compared to China. 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2016). 
In addition, Asian countries are not the only ones “receiving” companies from China, as 
Mexico has been a common replacement for American firms. This U.S.-Mexico relationship 
is interesting for the United States due to several reasons. On one hand, proximity solves one 
of the main challenges GVCs have, and the cultural and economic strong relationship 
between the two countries enables continuous trade. This economic tie is supported by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created a trilateral trade bloc 
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between Canada, the United States and Mexico. The automotive industry, computer and 
electronic appliances are some of the manufacturing industries in the U.S. that rely on the 
assistance of Mexican manufacturers. In just the automobile industry alone, Mexico is the 
host for several important companies such as Ford, GM or Toyota. Furthermore, the list of 
firms is bound to increase in the following years with BMW or Audi. (Congressional 
Research Service, 2020). 
When analyzing world trade data in the following graphs, Graph 14. EU Imports, CIF from 
Partner Countries, Graph 15. U.S Imports, CIF from Partner Countries and Graph 16. China 
Imports, CIF from Partner Countries in pages 50 and 51 it can be established some of the 
ideas mentioned before. The data set from the International Monetary Fund (IFM) shows the 
main import trade partners of the three major economies, the European Union, the United 
States and China for the period 2014-2020. Imports are defined as the goods and services 
purchased from the rest of the world under CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight).  
When looking at products imported by the European Union it can be seen that the main 
partners are indeed member of the EU as Germany or the Netherlands. However, China is 
also an important exporter for the EU and has slightly increased its participation since 2014. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that European companies still bring intermediate products 
from China. On the other hand, United States’ imports differ somewhat to the EU. Imports 
from China from 2014 to 2020 have decreased in -6,71% while imports from Mexico have 
increased 10,65%.  This decrease in Chinese imports is not only explained by the U.S.-China 
trade war as other economies imports have decreased as well, like Canada imports. Therefore, 
one of the main reasons why overall imports have diminished is deglobalization and a general 
decline in world trade. However, the increase in trade of Mexican products can be explain by 
the advantages the country has in terms of profit margins and proximity.  
When observing the “Mighty Five” (Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam) and 
other countries as Taiwan, it can be seen that their presence as trade partners have increased. 
In the case of China’s imports for instance, Taiwan has become the leading exporter in 2020, 
when in 2014 was the fourth partner. USA imports from Vietnam have increased 
considerably as well since 2014. In that year American imports from Vietnam were 30.588,51 
million dollars and in 2020, 79.645,03, reaching an increase of 160%. The same happened in 
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the European Union, as there was an increase of 53% of imported products from Vietnam. 
The 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index from Deloitte stated that “These 
nations could represent a “New China” in terms of low-cost labor, agile manufacturing 
capabilities, favorable demographic profiles, market and economic growth”. 
Regarding the development of other emerging economies as key participants in GVSs, there 
are projections about the future of the manufacturing sector in Africa. The main drivers of 
manufacturing are talent (human capital), cost competitiveness and workforce productivity. 
The African continent therefore, offers several favorable factors that drive manufacturing 
competitiveness particularly in terms of low-cost labor and abundance of raw materials. Irene 
Yuan Sun, a Harvard Business School Graduate, whose work has been featured in 
the Harvard Business Review explains in her last published book “How Chinese Investment 
Is Reshaping Africa” how the African continent could become an important component of 
the globalized economy through Chinese investment. While western companies are still 
reluctant to some extent in investing in Africa, Chinese manufacturers are setting up 
manufacturing business across the continent. The author states that a similar case of 
industrialization in China could happen in the African continent, as it was not long ago that 
China had similar structural characteristics (poor living conditions). China is the fastest 
growing source of foreign investment in Africa and managers used to carry out business 
operations under difficult environments such us Chinese mangers could start the 
development of the emerging continent.   
Furthermore, European and American companies are also considering Africa as a possible 
business destination. This interest is not only for production factories but for technological 
development industries, as managers see in the continent a potential location for technology 
disruption due to the increasing number of tech hubs.  
However, there are still some challenges to overcome, as despite the fact that standards of 
education on the continent are improving, the still low education levels and poor health 
conditions could hinder productivity and new-technology absorption. In addition, Africa has 
been associated with problematic infrastructure and high levels of corruption. (Signé, L., & 




2. Increase of domestic production  
 
Global Value Chains are not about producing physical products but about discovering new 
ways of creating and capturing value. Changes in consumer demand, government policies 
and supply chain economics are influencing the way in which business operate. The strong 
focus on customer-oriented business strategies, is making international companies to go from 
a low-cost labor approach to improving customer demand and shorten lead times with more 
local suppliers. This increasing phenomenon is known as “reshoring”. Reshoring is a 
reversion of a previous offshoring decision, thereby ‘bringing manufacturing back home’ 
(Gray et al. J Supply Chain Management, 2013). This trend has been reinforced by supply 
chain sustainability. Studies have shown how important is to create long-term supply network 
and building trustworthy relationships between members when managing a sustainable 
supply chain. This collaborative network is done better under local suppliers than global, 
therefore encouraging the progressive reshoring of business activities. (Ashby, A., 2016).  
Furthermore, in the case of high-end brands, supply chain strategy through reshoring and 
increasing control in supply chain operations can improve value and firm competitiveness. 
Reshoring in this case would not be an economic decision but a strategic decision made by 
companies to be able to use the “country of origin” as a competitive tag. The Burberry 
company for instance, moved back all the factories to the UK with the purpose of maintaining 
the brand’s heritage (Robinson, P. K., & Hsieh, L., 2016). 
Sustainability and strategic decisions are not the only forces influencing reshoring, several 
countries have manifested tendencies towards protectionism and national policy encouraging 
firms to go back to their “home country”.  This phenomenon has been strengthened by the 
pandemic, as it exposed the strong dependency countries have towards Global Value Chains. 
A clear example of these types of policies was when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
announced in March 2020 a stimulus package of $2.2 billion with the purpose of helping 
Japanese manufacturers shift production out of China.  
With all being said, reshoring is a clear tendency in response to a combination of rising 
production costs, sustainability awareness and international pressures.  
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3. Production within China  
 
Despite increasing labor costs, IP issues and the U.S trade war, when other aspects like 
market access, transportation costs, efficiency and infrastructure development are taken into 
account, China is still one of the more cost-efficient locations. When looking at both graphs, 
Graph 14. EU Imports, CIF from Partner Countries and Graph 15. U.S Imports, CIF from 
Partner Countries in page 50 it can be seen that China is still the leading exporter for the U.S 
despite the decrease in trade volume.  Furthermore, the country is also the second trade 
partner of the European Union after Germany, as imports from China are over $400,000 
million.  
While some manufacturing companies are deciding to leave China for cheaper alternatives 
in labor cost, China has started to shift production towards a different approach. The country 
has been focusing for several years now on the development of innovation infrastructure to 
strengthen advanced technologies.  As a consequence, China now wants to focus on higher-
end production, moving away from labor-intensive manufacturing. Since 2010, China has 
issued a series of relevant industrial policies to support the transformation and development 
of manufacturing industry, putting forward the idea of “promoting traditional industries to 
move towards the middle and high-end,” emphasizing the development of “high-end 
manufacturing areas,” and enhancing technological innovation capabilities. An example of 
these types of policies is “the National Strategic Emerging Industries Development Plan for 
the 13th Five-Year Plan” in 2016, which consists on promoting ten strategic emerging 
industries, all belonging to the high-end manufacturing industry. Industries such as aerospace 
equipment, information technology or high-performance medical devices. (Li, Q., & Liu, T., 
2019). 
Development of smart manufacturing in China is possible due to its market space, cost 
advantages and a full understanding of the domestic market and indeed, the overall 
technological level of the country has improved considerably. However, some challenges 




Future evolution of Global Value Chains 
 
As it can be seen GVCs are undergoing through changes related to their organization and 
location alternatives. GVCs managerial decisions will be extremely important for the 
operating of businesses and will depend on the industry and the goal of the company, whether 
is quick responsiveness or low landed costs for instance.  
While all the aforementioned ideas are current and existing tendencies, the future of GVC 
will be a mixture of all. First of all, world trade will have to recover from the pandemic. The 
World Trade Organization forecasts that world trade will recover increasing around 8% 
respect to 2020. However, deglobalization already in place before the pandemic is expected 
to continue in 2022. (Graph 17.  Volume of world merchandise trade (Annual % change) 
forecast for 2021 and 2022, page 51).  
Regarding future evolution of GVCs, specially related to location issues, China is believed 
to maintain its strong position in the following years. However, production will not solely be 
based on Chinese manufacturing, but other emerging economies will participate as well. 
Therefore, instead of shifting manufacturing from China to other countries like Indonesia or 
Vietnam the most possible model of manufacturing in the future will be the “China Plus One” 
model. This model consists on businesses keeping a great share of their manufacturing in 
China but diversifying other parts to different countries, particularly high-labor intensive 
activities. While this is a trend currently in place as it can be seen from Graph 16. China 
Imports, CIF from Partner Countries in million U.S. dollars in page 51, is expected to 
consolidate in the next years. While China is focusing on moving towards more “smart 
manufacturing” activities through innovation and technological development, high-labor 
intensive activities may continue there in the future. The main reason of why this could 
happen is automatization. It is important to recall that China is one of the world leading 
countries in using industrial robots and this will enable companies to produce at a large scale 
maintaining the cost advantage. Automatization of business processes is starting to be in 
place in the automobile and electronic industry but in the following years, it could expand to 




Regarding projections in the African continent, there are policies already in place to reach 
economic development through participation in GVCs. An example is the Linking Agenda 
2063 of the African Union and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.  One of the main 
goals is “Transformed economies” that have as an objective to “build resilient infrastructure, 
promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”.  It is true that as 
labor costs are increasing in other developing areas, those manufacturing activities could 
migrate to Africa, and indeed in 2018 the World Bank suggested that spending in 
manufacturing in Africa will reach $666.3 billion by 2030, which would mean a considerably 
increase. The main advantage Africa has when becoming a key element of GVCs is the 
increasing size of its low-cost labor force. Nevertheless, industrial development through 
GVCs in Africa is still a difficult challenge and has become even harder after the Covid 
pandemic. The main problem is the lack of viable economic and political foundations that 
would enable companies operate in the continent. It can be concluded that while industrial 
revolution seems imminent in the African continent, the development will not copy the Asian 
growth model, as Africa has its unique demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  
Other important aspect that will have an impact on GVCs in the future is the growing power 
of consumers.  One of the main characteristics of future consumers is how informed they are, 
as information is easily accessed nowadays. Consumers will be more demanding in terms of 
sustainability, social responsibility and quick response in the future. Therefore, managers and 
their businesses will have to adapt and meet consumer’s expectations. This will not only 
affect the operating of GVCs but their location as well. Brand’s image is perceived as better 
and more sustainable when labelled as “produced locally”. On the other hand, more resilient 
GVCs will be needed to meet the on-going demands.   Furthermore, the European Union is 
seeing the importance of having more autonomous GVCs in the future focusing on a long-










Global Value Chains since their rise in the 1980s thanks to the openness to trade of several 
economies and the emergence of governing bodies like the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), they have been a key feature of the globalized world.  
Looking at the evolution of GVC and the participation of countries in them, it can be 
concluded that participation has been strong overall (except during the economic crisis in 
2007) from 2005 to 2015, with forward linkages more stable than backward linkages. During 
those years there was an increase in GVC participation of several Asian countries and Easter 
European economies. China has been the world leading participant in both types of linkages, 
being the principal importer and exporter of manufactured goods. This participation in GVCs 
has have an impact on countries. Looking at data it can be determined that while GVCs matter 
for economic development, particularly in terms of GDP growth and information sharing, 
they may have caused an increase between income groups.  
World trade has been decreasing for several years now, shifting the economy towards 
deglobalization and influencing the way GVCs operate. Trends encouraging changes are 
mainly political tensions and increasing protectionism, environmental regulations, increasing 
labor costs in developing areas and different approaches towards costs. All the 
aforementioned aspects hindering development of GVCs were reinforced by the Covid-19  
pandemic, which exposed how global supply chains may be unresponsive to external shocks.  
Determining the appropriate reconfiguration of GVC and business strategy is essential for 
managers. Forecasts mentioned that world trade will recover from the pandemic but 
deglobalization will continue. Despite this, GVCs will be maintained with a slightly different 
structure. Manufacturing will not only be China based but other emerging countries like the 
“Mighty Five” (Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam) or the African continent 
with lower labor costs will participate as well. On the other hand, China will move towards  
higher-end production, moving away from labor-intensive manufacturing. Furthermore, 
shorter GVCs or more local supply chains will increase as well, with the objective of creating 
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Graph 1. Exports of goods and services for the World 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
Map 1. Global Participation of the World Economies in GVCs in 2005 
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Map 2. Position of the World Economies in the Supply Chain in 2005 
 
Source: OECD estimates based on Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database 
 
Map 3. Global Participation of the World Economies in GVCs in 2015 
 
Source: OECD estimates based on Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database 
43 
 
Map 4. Position of the World Economies in the Supply Chain in 2015 
 
Source: OECD estimates based on Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database 
 
Graph 2. Backward Linkages from 2005 to 2015 
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Graph 3. Forward Linkages from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: OECD estimates based on Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database 
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Graph 5. Position of the Economies in the Supply Chain from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: OECD estimates based on Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database 
Graph 6. Attitudes towards globalization against change in GDP per person  
 
Note. The Economist. (2016, November). Attitudes towards globalization against 
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Graph 7. GDP growth (annual %) for several economies 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
Graph 8. GDP (current US$) of several economies (In millions)   
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Table 1. Skilled to unskilled ratio in industries 
 
Source: Blankenau, William & Cassou, Steven (2005). 
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Graph 10. GDP growth (annual %) - China 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
 
Graph 11. GDP per capita (current US$) - China 
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Source: World Wealth and Income Database 
 
Graph 13. Relationship between trade and inequality- The United States  
Source: World Wealth and Income Database 
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Graph 14. EU Imports, CIF from Partner Countries in million U.S. dollars 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database 
 
Graph 15. U.S Imports, CIF from Partner Countries in million U.S. dollars 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database 
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Graph 16. China Imports, CIF from Partner Countries in million U.S. dollars  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database 
 Graph 17.  Volume of world merchandise trade (Annual % change) forecast for 2021 and 
2022 
Source: WTO for trade, consensus estimates for GDP 
